We study how the trajectory of health for the near-elderly uninsured changes upon enrolling into Medicare at the age of 65. We find that Medicare increases the probability of the previously uninsured having excellent or very good health, decreases their probability of being in good health, and has no discernable effects at lower health levels. Surprisingly, we found Medicare had a similar effect on health for the previously insured. This suggests that Medicare helps the relatively healthy 65 year olds, but does little for those who are already in declining health once they reach the age of 65. The improvement in health between the uninsured and insured were not statistically different from each other. It may be the stability of insurance coverage afforded by Medicare that imparts a health benefit suggesting that universal coverage at other ages may have similar health effects.
Introduction
The Medicare program provides near universal health insurance coverage for Americans over the age of 65, while those under 65 are predominantly reliant on employersponsored health insurance for affordable health insurance coverage. The substantial gaps in coverage resulting from the employer-based system are partially filled by individually purchased policies and public insurance (primarily Medicaid), but 18% of the non-elderly, 45.5 million people in 2004, remain without health insurance. Because health insurance reduces the financial barriers of using the medical system to maintain or prevent the deterioration of health, the uninsured may experience indirect negative consequences to their health as a result of health care foregone from a lack of incentives for obtaining medical care (Institute of Medicine, 2001) . Because the near-elderly uninsured obtain health insurance through the Medicare program at the age of 65, they may experience a health benefit from this transition. The goal of this paper is to determine the effect of the Medicare program on the health of the near-elderly uninsured.
Understanding whether there is a health benefit to the near-elderly uninsured from the Medicare program is an important aspect of policy debates regarding expanding and contracting Medicare coverage. As we approach the year 2018 --when the Medicare trust fund reserves are projected to be exhausted (Trustees of the Social Security and Medicare trust funds, 2006) -policy changes to Medicare may become necessary. The near-elderly uninsured may be particularly vulnerable to any contraction in Medicare coverage because Medicare arrives at an age when treatable health conditions are emerging at an increasing rate. Despite the importance of health insurance for this age group, 25% of the near-elderly will experience a period without health insurance between ages 55 and 65 (Baker et al., 2005) . This may be partially due to the fact that affordable coverage is difficult to find for those lacking health insurance with existing or emerging health conditions. Although all are guaranteed an issue of a health insurance policy in the individual market through the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the law does not limit the amount insurers can charge for such coverage.
Hence, premium levels can exceed the financial resources of all but the wealthiest individuals. As a result, several policy proposals have emerged to address this vulnerable group including expansions in the Medicare program to cover the uninsured in the 55 to 65 age group. Understanding the direct and indirect benefits of providing health insurance to the near-elderly uninsured can help inform these policies. The health effects of policies specifically aimed to provide insurance to the near-elderly uninsured have not been established.
In this paper, we use a quasi-experimental approach to establish the health effects of insurance for the near-elderly uninsured. Those who acquire health insurance typically do so for a reason: they may have gained employment that offers coverage; they may have qualified for coverage from the federal government as a result of poverty or disability; or they may have purchased insurance in the individual market. In all of these cases, the decision to purchase health insurance may be related to recent and projected changes in health status, making it difficult to empirically assess the health effects of acquiring insurance using cross-sectional comparisons. In contrast, uninsured persons who turn 65 acquire health insurance through the Medicare program simply by aging in.
Therefore, by using panel data to assess how gaining Medicare coverage at age 65 changes the health trajectory of the near-elderly uninsured as they age into their late 60s and early 70s, we can identify how insurance changes the trajectory of health.
Literature on Health Insurance and Health
The Institute of Medicine Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance examined the relationship between being uninsured and the health of American adults (Institute of Medicine, 2002) . The Committee concluded that if the roughly 30 million working-age uninsured Americans were to become continuously insured, their health would be expected to improve. The studies on general health supporting these conclusions find that being uninsured for relatively short periods (1 to 4 years) appears to result in a decrease in general health status (Baker et al., 2001 ) and that uninsured adults followed for 5 to 17 years are at higher risk of premature death than are persons with private coverage (Franks et al., 1993; Sorlie et al., 1994) . Hundreds of other studies have also documented a disparity in morbidity between the uninsured and the insured (Literature reviews : Brown et al., 1998; Hadley, 2003; Institute of Medicine, 2002) . From these studies, however, it is difficult to determine the causal relation between health insurance and health for several reasons. A positive association between health insurance and health may reflect the effects of health on health insurance (reverse causation) or the effects of some other unobserved attribute on both health insurance and health (selection) (Levy and Meltzer, 2004 ).
The only experimental study of the effect of insurance on health was the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). Between 1974 and 1982, the HIE randomly assigned roughly 2,000 families to one of 14 experimental health plans that varied in their costsharing arrangements (Newhouse et al., 1981; Newhouse et al., 1993) . Although the study found sizable effects of more generous health insurance on use and expenditures, effects on health status were more modest. For low-income persons with high blood pressure, free care brought an improvement in blood pressure control. Vision also improved among those with poor vision. No significant effects were detected on eight other measures of health status and health habits for adults (Brook et al., 1983) . The absence of a health effect could be due to the presence of a cap on out-of-pocket health expenditures by all enrollees that was, at most, 15% of income (Newhouse et al., 1993) .
This randomized social experiment is of limited use for our purposes because (1) it did not include a study group with no health insurance and (2) it excluded the Medicareeligible population and thus excluded the elderly population.
By exploiting a natural experiment from a change in the eligibility of pregnant women for Medicaid benefits, a few quasi-experimental studies have provided evidence of a causal relation between health insurance and health of newborns (Joyce, 1998; Epstein and Newhouse, 1998; Baldwin et al., 1998; Ray et al., 1997; Currie and Gruber, 1996a , 1996b Reichman and Florio, 1995; Haas et al., 1993; Fossett et al., 1992; Buescher et al., 1991; Piper et al., 1990) . The findings generally suggest that health insurance does result in modest reductions in infant mortality.
More recently, quasi-experimental designs have been applied to the question of health and health insurance around the introduction of Medicare. Decker and Rapaport (2002) found that mortality decreased significantly after women diagnosed with early breast cancer acquired Medicare. Finkelstein and McKnight (2005) reported that the establishment of Medicare in 1965 had no discernible impact on the mortality of the elderly in the 10 years following Medicare's enactment.
The hypothesized mechanism by which health effects might occur is through increased or more timely use of medical services with insurance and Medicare. The HIE provides direct experimental evidence that a reduction in out-of-pocket costs increases utilization and expenditures for health care services (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse et al., 1993) .
Several recent observational studies provide strong evidence of the increased use of medical services due to Medicare. State hospital discharge datasets have also been used to assess how Medicare might alter medical service use (Lichtenberg, 2002; Card et al., 2004) . These studies have found that utilization rates for doctor visits and hospitalizations (particularly hospitalizations for discretionary conditions) increase at age 65, the cusp of Medicare eligibility. McWilliams et al. (2003) , using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), found a jump in preventive care utilization between just before and just after age 65. Because so many medical procedures have been found to reduce risks of death and disability (Aiken and Bays, 1984; Cassel et al., 1999; Fuchs, 1999; McClellan and Noguchi, 1998) , the assertion that Medicare and other forms of health insurance that improved access to medical care has helped Americans live longer, healthier, and more independent lives is compelling.
Yet no study has looked directly at how the introduction of Medicare may change the health trajectory of the previously uninsured using individual-level data. We hypothesize that the health trajectory of previously uninsured persons will improve as a result of the introduction of Medicare at age 65. The mechanism for this change would be the greater use of medical care induced by subsidized, universal health insurance coverage. There may also be contemporaneous changes occurring at this age. The most obvious are the higher rates of retirement and the introduction of Social Security payments at age 65.
Because of these other changes occurring simultaneously, we will also test whether the health trajectory of the previously uninsured changes by more than that of the previously insured.
Conceptual and Empirical Framework
Health insurance and medical care exist to maintain and improve health, and to guard against the financial risks associated with poor health. Health can be viewed as an asset that has a natural rate of deterioration over time. A medical event can hasten that deterioration. Medical care is used after a medical event to restore, maintain, or prevent further decline in health (Grossman, 1972) . The expenditure for this medical care is sometimes large and unexpected. Insurance reduces the financial risk associated with higher medical expenses after a health event. Health insurance plays other important roles in this relationship, including allowing access to health care that would otherwise be unaffordable (de Meza 1983 , Nyman, 1999 and increasing demand for medical care because the person using health care with insurance typically does not pay the entire cost of that care (Pauly, 1968) .
Determining whether the additional medical care afforded by the introduction of health insurance affects health may be complicated by adverse selection: the decision to acquire or to drop health insurance is often related to one's health status (sometimes this is not a decision -it happens because a person involuntarily loses their job with employmentbased benefits). For example, one could acquire health insurance before seeing the doctor for an emerging health problem. Unless the health status factors that led to the change in insurance status are perfectly controlled for, assessing causality in the empirical evaluation of the relationship between change in health insurance status and health status is problematic because the effects of the unmeasured or mismeasured aspects of poor health may be attributed to being insured.
The empirical framework in this paper focuses on the introduction of Medicare insurance at age 65, where the introduction of government-subsidized health insurance for previously uninsured persons occurs independently of any underlying health status change other than aging one more year. Because government policy restricts entry into Medicare until age 65 for most Americans, those who take up Medicare insurance (at age 65, but not those before age 65) do so for reasons other than changes in health status. It is the introduction of health insurance at age 65 for no other reason than turning this age that creates the natural experiment used in our key comparisons.
A stylized version of our model is expressed as
where ΔH is the change in health status between age and age+1, U is an indicator of whether subjects are uninsured prior to age 65, M is an indicator for the ages subjects are enrolled in Medicare. We can determine from the estimated coefficients the average change in health status ( H Δ ) in the pre-Medicare and post-Medicare period for both the Uninsured and the Insured groups: ΔH Upre =β 0 + β 1 , ΔH Upost =β 0 + β 1 + β 2 + β 3 , ΔH Ipre =β 0 , and
To simplify the notation, we refer to these four H Δ groups as U pre , U post , I pre , and I post . They are depicted as slopes in Figure 1 . From H Δ , we can estimate the change in the rate of health decline after the introduction of Medicare for the Uninsured and Insured groups (ΔU and ΔI) by subtracting the pre change from the post change.
Finally, we estimate the change in the rate of health decline for the Uninsured using the Insured group as a control by ΔU-ΔI. Note that while, for simplicity, the graph depicts no intercept change at 65, our modeling does allow for this.
This experimental opportunity at age 65 is not exact for two reasons. First, initial insurance status is not random assigned, which could bias our findings: certain factors, such as low socioeconomic status, can cause poor health and lower rates of health insurance coverage. With the first-difference approach, baseline health differences between the insured and uninsured (both observed and unobserved differences) are removed. By controlling for the characteristics of the groups, we control for differences in the rate of change in health status due to differences in these characteristics. Second, other changes confounded with health status may also occur at age 65, including retirement and Social Security payments. We consider the change in trajectory of the insured as a proxy for these contemporaneous changes. We directly consider how sensitive our comparisons are to the time-dependent (but potentially endogenous) changes to job status and Social Security payments. In addition the difference in the change at age 65 between the insured and uninsured groups provides a control for contemporaneous changes.
Data
The data were obtained from the original age-eligible cohort of the Health and Retirement Study ( Our study sample includes birth cohorts 1932-1937 (grey shading in Figure 2 ). These birth cohorts have the potential to be observed at 59/60 and twice once they reach the age of 65. By using the same participants for the pre-and post-eligibility periods removes the possibility of a birth cohort effect; we excluded the 1938-1941 birth cohorts for this reason. Starting all individuals when they are 59/60 removes the possibility of leftcensoring bias that would result from a differential death rate by insurance status and age cohort; to avoid this, we excluded the 1931 cohort and started following the included birth cohorts at age 59/60. As a result, we studied the 1932-1937 birth cohorts (N = 5,086).
We also excluded persons who dropped out or died before age 59/60 (n = 226), those with missing insurance status (n = 55), the few persons who reported never receiving Medicare after age 65 (n = 31), those with no follow-up after age 59/60 (n = 127), and those on Medicare or Medicaid at age 59/60 (n = 572). We will use sensitivity analysis to test the influence of this last exclusion. Our final study sample consists of 4,075 persons (Table 1) .
In each wave, HRS respondents provided detailed information about their current insurance coverage. They were asked whether they received any employment-based coverage, individual coverage, and coverage through federal programs such as Medicare or Medicaid. The uninsured are defined as those whose response indicated they had no form of private or public insurance. Those uninsured at age 59/60 represent the uninsured group and those insured at age 59/60 represent the insured group. The insured group consists of 3,484 persons, and the uninsured group consists of 591 persons (Table 2) .
Everyone is insured through Medicare once participants cross the age 65 threshold, but the analytical labels for our comparison groups are held fixed according to their insurance status at age 59/60. The percentage of uninsured persons drops from 14.5% to 14.0%
between the pre and post period because of the higher death rate in the uninsured group.
However, switching between insured and uninsured states is possible before age 65. In fact, 9.7% of the sample switched from insured to uninsured or from uninsured to insured between 59/60 and 63/64. Because our interest is determining whether health is a consequence of one's insurance status, we would like the definition of insurance status to not be a consequence of a health event. Therefore, our primary analysis is based on the initial insurance status (i.e. insurance status at age 59/60). In a sensitivity analysis, we compare the group continuously insured and the group continuously uninsured.
While wave-specific overall response rates average 88.6%, persons who are uninsured are more likely to be lost to follow-up than persons who are insured. The HRS sample weights account for attrition (in addition to the complex sample design) through a poststratification of the HRS to the Current Population Survey (CPS) by age, sex, race, ethnicity, and marital status groups. This stratification explains differential non-response over time by those major demographic groups. Because differential attrition by insurance status remained, we used the CPS to apply an additional adjustment to the HRS weights by age, race, labor force status, education, and insurance status to arrive at our final weights. These adjusted weights are used in all analyses.
The primary outcome measure is self-reported health status combined with mortality. The former is measured by the question, "Would you say that your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?" Mortality is reported by surviving family members or other contacts, and non-reported mortality is obtained through a link of the HRS files with the National Death Index. Self-reported health status has been used as a measure of health for many previous studies that related insurance coverage to health outcomes (Fihn and Wicher, 1988; Hafner-Eaton, 1993; Lurie et al., 1984; Short and Lair, 1994) and has been shown to have predictive validity for both future health care utilization and subsequent mortality (Manning et al., 1987; DeSalvo, 2006) . Due to the small sample sizes on the extremes of this scale, we combine the excellent and very good health status categories and the fair and poor categories.
Our control variables include patient demographics and socioeconomic status. The sociodemographic variables include sex, age, education, ethnicity, race, and region.
Marital status, income, and wealth are also included as explanatory variables, but with caution because they may be considered endogenous. Wealth and income measures are converted to 2004 real U.S. dollars adjusted by the Consumer Price Index.
Empirical Model
We estimate health state transition between the health state in wave t (H t ) and the health state in wave t+1 (H t+1 ). H t+1 is a categorical variable with four categories: j = (excellent/very good (E), good (G), fair/poor (F) and died (D)). The transitions from H t to H t+1 are estimated by using the following multinomial logit model:
where p ij is the probability of being in health status category j for participant i at wave To provide interpretability from the large number of estimated relevant coefficients in our multinomial logit model, we simulate how the estimated health state transitions will change the health state for U and I as the subjects in these groups age. The simulation is conducted as follows. First, we start with the sample when they are 59/60. We then use the estimated coefficients from the health transition model to predict their probability of being in each of the four health states at 61/62. Each subject's realized health state at 61/62 is then determined from a random draw from a uniform distribution on the unit interval. We then repeat this process using the predicted health states at 61/62 as their baseline health state for the prediction of the probability of being in each of the four health states at 63/64. This process is repeated until each subject is aged to 71/72. Those subjects who enter the dead state are treated as dead for all remaining ages in the simulation and are dropped from the repeated predictions for subsequent ages. In addition to simulating the health of subjects as they age onto Medicare, we simulate the health of subjects as they age from 65 to 71 assuming they did not receive Medicare.
This out-of-sample simulation is performed by not "turning on M" for ages beyond 65.
The simulation is similar to a Markov chain, but instead of using average transition probabilities and averages for initial conditions, the Markov process is conducted at the individual level. This allows for unique transition probabilities for each individual's covariates. This greatly simplifies the process when the time dependent covariates of retirement and Social Security payments are added to the model. However, random variation enters because realized states are based on a random draw. This variation is reduced because we repeat the simulation 100 times for each individual.
When the simulation is complete, the average proportion of subjects in each health status at each age for each insurance group is estimated as well as for the counterfactual post period of U and I. We then estimate the change in health state over a 6-year period for each insurance group (i.e. U pre , I pre , U post , I post ) by subtracting the health state probability at age 71 from the health state probability at age 65. The difference in difference for each insurance group (ΔU and ΔI) is defined as the difference in a 6-year change in health status caused by Medicare enrollment at age 65 ((U post -U pre ) and (I post -I pre )). Finally, the difference between these two differences gives the change in health status caused by Medicare enrollment at age 65 for the uninsured, controlling for any contemporaneous changes in health over time. These calculations are depicted graphically in Figure 3 .
We estimated standard errors and significance in the multinomial logit using robust standard errors (White, 1980) , correcting for clustering at the person level. We estimated confidence intervals of the health state probabilities estimated in the simulation using the percentile method from a non-parametric clustered bootstrap. The cluster was at the individual level to maintain the serial correlation pattern at the individual level without assuming an explicit form for the autocorrelation (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) .
We then estimate the base model for several important subgroups: continuous insurance groups, by gender, for low income and low wealth, and for those with and without supplemental insurance. Low income (wealth) group is defined as those with income (wealth) below the median in that wave when 59/60. This translates into income below $46,000 and wealth below $156,000 in 1996 dollars. Supplemental insurance is defined as any additional insurance to Medicare. This includes employer insurance, individual insurance, a MediGap plan, VA Champus, and Medicaid. Finally, we perform several robustness checks. We explore whether the results are robust to additional control variables such as time-dependent retirement and Social Security payments, to alternative age specifications, to alternative health status categorizations, and to weighting. Table 3 shows the baseline characteristics of the study sample by insurance status. The insured and uninsured groups in the HRS at age 59/60 are representative of these groups in the United States. The uninsured are more likely to be in fair or poor health, are less likely to work, have lower education and lower income, and are more likely to be African American or Hispanic. Although the uninsured are more likely to have diabetes and psychiatric problems and to visit the hospital, they are less likely to visit the doctor. To better understand the direction of these health changes, we turn to the simulated trajectories depicted in As a check on the fit of our model and our simulation to the raw data on health status for our sample, we graphically display the raw trajectories with the trajectories from our fitted data in Figure 5 . This dramatically demonstrates the remarkable fit of our model. The comparisons between the insured and uninsured groups in column [G] show 1.8 more reporting excellent or very good health in the uninsured group and 2.8 fewer reporting fair or poor in the uninsured group. Although not statistically significant, this does suggest that providing health insurance to the uninsured does has a modest health effect. Table 6 displays results for various subgroups. There is a similar pattern when the analysis is limited to the continuously insured and the continuously uninsured. The uninsured enrolling into Medicare appears to have a slightly greatest positive influence on women compared with men in terms of the gain in excellent/very good health. The comparisons in the low-income and low-wealth groups look remarkably similar to the overall result. Finally, we compare the subgroup of those with supplemental versus those without supplemental insurance. The rates of death increase for both subgroups because those who died before 65 were dropped from both subgroups because supplemental status could not be determined. The relative difference between the uninsured and insured is greater for the uninsured who also obtain supplemental insurance. Table 7 presents the sensitivity of the results to various alternatives. The results are insensitive to retirement, change in marital status, or introduction of Social Security payments suggesting that the difference within the insured and uninsured groups cannot be attributed to these often contemporaneous changes at age 65. The results are insensitive to alternative age specifications. Our main concern is that our use of a quadratic age specification was not appropriately capturing the non-linear trajectory of health status with age. In this series of robustness checks, we find almost no non-linear pattern of health status changes and age. The three alternative age specifications considered (i.e., 2a, 2b, and 2c in Table 7 ) are nearly identical to the base model, suggesting that we have appropriately specified the age/health trajectory.
Results
Panel 3 in Table 7 shows the model when the five living health states are not collapsed into three living health states. The three health states used in the base model potentially mask some differences between the excellent and very good health states and between the fair and poor health states, but the smaller sample sizes in the disaggregated groups leads to noisier estimates. Generally, the condensed groups are a fair representation of the more specific patterns in this panel. When the five categories of health status in the multinomial logit but summarizes the results in the same way as the base model. Here the results are similar to the base model.
Panel 4 in Table 7 shows the results excluding the weights. The weighting slightly increases the additional number of persons with excellent/very good health and this increase is greater in the uninsured group. Given the greater rates of attrition among the uninsured, the weighted estimate offers an appropriate adjustment for the observable attrition differences between groups.
Conclusion
Because the number of near elderly is rising rapidly and there are few affordable alternatives for health insurance for those who lack access to employment-based coverage, the uninsured near-elderly are of growing concern. We find that providing
Medicare to the uninsured increases their probability of being in excellent or very good health, decreases their probability of being in good health, and has no discernable effects at lower health levels. Surprisingly, we found Medicare had the same pattern of effect on the health of the previously insured. This suggests that Medicare helps the relatively healthy 65 year olds, but does little for those who are already in declining health once they reach the age of 65. The improvement in health from Medicare for the uninsured was not statistically different from the improvement in health from Medicare for the insured. However, the direction of the statistically insignificant effect is suggestive of a greater health effect for the previously uninsured.
The health status improvement for the uninsured is consistent with the evidence that the lack of health insurance in the period immediately preceding Medicare eligibility is associated with faster declines in health (Baker et al., 2001; Hadley and Waidmann, 2006; Dor, Sudano, and Baker, 2006 ); it appears Medicare may be attenuating the rapid health declines of the uninsured. However, the introduction of Medicare also improved the health of those who enrolled into Medicare at age 65 and were insured before this age. This may be a result of the aspects of the Medicare program itself. Medicare offers a more stable source of health insurance which may itself have a health advantage because the decision to leave work when one is recovering from an illness may improve recovery (Bradley et al., 2005) . This might outweigh the possibility that insurance coverage under Medicare may be less generous, on average, when compared to employer-sponsored health insurance, even in the presence of private supplemental coverage that is obtained by many Medicare beneficiaries. Alternatively, it may reflect health changes resulting from contemporaneous changes at age 65, such as retirement and Social Security payments. However, the results remain when controls for retirement and Social Security were added to the model. While Medicare improved health status for both the previously uninsured and insured, there was no effect on mortality. The lack of any survival improvement after Medicare enrollment is consistent with Finkelstein and McKnight (2005) who found, using aggregate data, that the establishment of Medicare had no discernible impact on the mortality of the elderly in the decade after the enactment of Medicare.
The potential for health improvements for the uninsured is supported by the evidence that use of medical services rises dramatically after enrollment into Medicare and that the increase is greater for those who become insured when they are eligible for Medicare than for those who were insured before Medicare enrollment. This effect of Medicare on health service use may be the mechanism for the positive effects on health status. A limitation of our study, however, is that, by using self-reported health status, our results may be influenced by subjective responses to the health status question. Further research into the mechanisms generating the effects measured in this paper is still needed.
We find that Medicare does improve the health of the uninsured and the insured, but only for the relatively healthy. This suggests that there are health benefits of universal coverage and that extending this coverage to much earlier ages may increase the proportion of the population who arrive at the age of 65 in excellent or very good health.
It also suggests that Medicare itself may be providing health benefits to the population.
When considering the value of health insurance, however, health is only one important aspect. Health insurance is designed to provide financial security to families by protecting them from potentially devastating financial consequences that can result from unexpected health care expenses (Himmelstein, et al., 2005) . The more direct financial justification for health insurance should not be forgotten as we seek to better understand its indirect health consequences. 
